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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the empirical relationship between 
government spending and private investment. A panel of 14 OECD 
countries is used. We present evidence which suggests the existence of 
a significant crowding-in effect of private investment by public 
investment, through the positive impact of infrastructure on private 
investment productivity. Moreover, government consumption appears to 
crowd out private investment. The implications of these results are of 
foremost importance when it comes to fiscal consolidation. Deficit 
reductions engineered through cuts in public investment could severely 
impinge upon private capital accumulation and growth prospects. 

1. INTRODUCTION: FISCAL POLICY, GROWTH, AND CROWDING OUT 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between private 
investment and government spending. Empirical evidence is brought to 
bear upon two closely related questions which lie at the core of the debate 
on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy: 1) Is public spending 
productive? 2) To what extent, if any, does government spending 
substitute for private investment? 
The first question has stimulated a considerable amount of research 
since Rubinson (1977) and Ram (1986) found a positive empirical 
relationship between government size and GDP growth. Although this 
association has also been obtained in more recent work (see Lin, 1994a), 
a number of papers have identified an inverse association between 
government spending and output growth (e.g. Grossman, 1988, Mallow, 
1986, Peden and Bradley, 1989, and Grier and Tullock, 1989). In a 
careful and comprehensive analysis of this issue, Dowrick (1993) 
concludes that government size does not appear to have a systematic and 
significant effect on growth. 
This literature has been criticized on three main grounds. First, 
as shown by Hsieh and La! (1994) and Dowrick (1993), the sign of the 
association is quite sensitive to the choice of the sample of countries, the 
period under study, the econometric techniques and the existence of 
measurement problems. Second, as different categories of spending are 
well documented to have diverse economic effects, analyses ignoring this 
fact are not easy to interpret. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Lin 
(1994b), for example, show that spending categories that promote human 
or physical capital accumulation are positively associated with growth, 
while other spending items have negative or neutral effects. Finally, the 
single equation findings on the government -size/GDP- growth link could 
be invalid when this relationship runs through indirect channels, i.e. 
private investment. 
These empirical shortcomings have a direct bearing on the second 
question. Since capital accumulation is the engine of output growth, any 
crowding-out effects of private investment by public spending impinge 
upon production expansion and welfare prospects. The bulk of the 
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empirical literature finds a significantly negative effect of public 
consumption on growth while the effects of public investment are found 
to be positive although less robust (Barro, 1991; Grier and Tullock, 1989; 
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). To what extent can these results be traced 
to a crowding out of private investment? Aschauer (l989b) finds that the 
direct crowding-out effect of public investment is outweighed by a direct 
crowding-in effect associated with the role of public capital as a 
productive input and its complementarity( 1) with private capital (see 
Aschauer, 1989a). The evidence gathered in Erenburg (1993), who 
estimates a simple macromodel with rational expectations, and in Erenburg 
and Wohar (1995), reinforces this conclusion, while the results in Bairam 
and Ward (1993) support the crowding-out hypothesis. As to the impact 
of government consumption, Aschauer (1989b) concludes that its 
crowding-out effect on private investment carries only a marginal 
explanatory power, a result that could be interpreted as an indication 
that public consumption is a close substitute for private consumption. 
However, recent evidence gathered by Karras (1994) forcefully suggests 
that private and government consumption are best described as 
complementary (or unrelated) goods(2), a feature that reinforces the 
crowding-out effect of private investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the 
theoretical arguments behind the crowding-out hypothesis. For 
expositional purposes, we use a simple overlapping-generations model in 
which public and private capital are complements, whereas public and 
private consumption are independent. Section III evaluates the impact on 
private investment and private productivity of public spending. The 
empirical results obtained with a panel of 14 OEeD countries are 
presented and briefly discussed. Finally, Section 1V draws the main 
conclusions. 
(1) Public and private capital are "complementary" when the marginal 
productivity of the private capital increases as the quantity of public 
capital increases. 
(2) If public consumption increases the marginal utility of private 
consumption, both are said to be "complementary", and viceversa. 
- 6 -
2. PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
The equilibrium approach developed in Aschauer (1988) and 
Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), among others, assumes a competitive 
economy populated by rational, identical, infinitely lived individuals. In 
this context, the general equilibrium relationship between public 
spending and private investment may be expressed in the following two 
equations: 
(1) 
(2) 
where i is private spending, fk is the marginal product of capital, ig and 
cq are public investment and public consumption, respectively, k is 
private capital and kg is public capital. Along neoclassical lines, changes 
in investment -which are described by the partial derivatives of the above 
functions- are the result of intertemporal smoothing of consumption by 
private agents. 
Aschauerts discussion of the crowding .. out issue is heuristic, due 
to the complexity of his analytic framework. Nonetheless, his qualitative 
conclusions carry over in much simpler neoclassical models. Suppose that 
our economy is populated by overlapping generations of equal size. Each 
household lives for two periods. Households earn labour income only in 
the first period. Labour supply is fixed. Consumption of a representative 
household when young in time t is: 
(3) 
whereas consumption when old at time t+ 1 can be written as: 
(4) 
where wt is the wage rate, St is savings, rt+1 is the interest rate in the 
second period and tt is a tax levied on the young. The government uses 
tax revenues to finance public consumption of a public good nature -which 
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enters household's utility function- and public investment -which is a 
productive input in private production. 
Suppose that the utility function of a representative agent is: 
(5) 
where Cgo is public consumption, 6 represents relative preference for 
private consumption and p is the rate of time preference. Maximization of 
(5) subject to (3) and (4) yields the savings function: 
u=_
l
_ 
2+p 
(6) 
For simplicity, assume that both private and public capital fully 
depreciate in every period. The production function in per worker terms 
is: 
(7) 
where i is private capital (and private investment) and i. is public capital 
(and public investment). Competition in factor markets implies: 
(8) 
(9) 
Capital available for production in t+l equals savings of the young in t. 
This gives the momentary equilibrium condition: 
This equation, together with the government budget constraint: 
define the equilibrium of the economy. 
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(10) 
(11) 
A permanent tax-financed inc:rease in public consumption reduces 
both first-period private consumption and savings, and thus investment 
in the next period. In the long-run, after dropping time subscripts, we 
obtain: 
di 
dc, 
a < 0 
l-aa( 1-<J)AiO-1i" , 
(12) 
provided that the economy is not too far away from the golden rule (note 
that when r=O, by equation 8 the denominator in 12 reduces to l-a(1-a». 
As this crowding-out effect generated by public consumption is associated 
with the effect of taxes upon savings, a tax-financed increase in public 
investment must also produce a direct crowding-out effect of private 
investment. However, public investment may have an additional effect: 
private investment is crowded-in whenever public capital raises the 
productivity of private capital. In fact, if the initial level of public capital 
were well below its optimal (I.e. output-maximizing) level, the 
crowding-in effect would outweigh the negative influence of taxes upon 
savings. More generally, the steady-state effect of an increase in public 
investment upon private capital accumulation is: 
a [1-Il (l-<J) Ai"i�'l 
l-aa(1-<J)Aio-'l! < 0 > (13) 
In the more elaborate Aschauer model this ambiguity emerges as 
well. The differences are just a matter of detail. When public and private 
capital are equally productive, an increase in public investment crowds 
out an equivalent amount of private investment, with no effects upon 
wealth and consumption. However, an additional crowding-out effect 
would arise if public investment were more productive: as lifetime wealth 
increases so does consumption today. These two short-run effects could 
be compensated by the crowding-in effect which operates through an 
increase in private capital productivity. As to the consequences of an 
increase in public consumption, Aschauer admits the possibility that its 
effect could be nil. If public consumption is a perfect substitute for 
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private consumption or the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
remains constant over time for every agent, private investment changes 
would not be needed to smooth out consumption. None of these 
assumptions are made in our simple expositional modeIP). 
3. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical analysis is carried out using the annual 
time-series-cross-section data from Summers and Heston (1991). Only the 
fourteen DECD countries with available data on Infrastructure capital 
were included for the perlo� 1979-88"', which resulted in an 
unbalanced panel data set. Data definitions are given in the Appendix. 
Our analysis of the crowding-out hypothesis is based on the 
estimation of the following pair of equations: 
where subscripts t refer to time and j to country) i and i9 are, 
respectively, private and public investment in relation to private 
productive capital stock (private and public investment rates), cq is 
public consumption, in relation to private productive capital stock, fk is 
(J' These models are not directly comparable. Note that we are 
assuming that public and private consumption are neither complementary 
nor substitutes. On the other hand, with income accruing only in the first 
period and a fixed propensity to save, crowding out obtains even if the 
marginal propensity to consume remains constant. In such case, which 
implies r;;; p, private investment is crowded-out by [l-a(1-p) r1 units per 
unit of additional government consumption spending. 
(4) The countries and the periods are the following ones: Australia 
(1979-87), Austria (1979-87), Belgium (1979-87), Canada (1979-88), 
Denmark (1979-88), Federal Republic of Germany (1979-88), Finland 
(1979-87), France (1979-88), Ireland (1979-87), Norway (1980-86), Spain 
(1979-86), Sweden (1979-87), United Kingdom (1979-87) and United 
States (1980-87). 
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marginal private capital productivity (which is proxied by the ratio of 
gross operating surplus to private productive capital stock), k is the 
stock of private productive capital and kg is infrastructure capital, so 
that no residential investment is involved(51. We would expect 82 to be 
positive, and both 8J and a. to be non-positive under the crowding-out 
hypothesis. On the other hand, given the standard assumption of 
decreasing marginal productivity, b2 is expected to be negative, and b3 
positive if infrastructures and private productive capital are 
complements. 
The econometric analysis of the crowding-out issue requires the use 
of techniques well suited to deal with country heterogeneity. Let us first 
refer to the most rectrictive version of (14) and (15). Assume that a.jt = 
8m and bllljt = bill' 'Vj, 'tit: that is, the response of private investment and 
private capital productivity to the right-hand side variables does not 
change over time nor across countries. The results of such a restrictive 
model are presented in column (1) of Table 1. In columns (2) to (6) we 
relax these restrictions so as to take into account the heterogeneity of the 
data. In column (2) we report the results of letting a1 and b1 change 
across countries while taking the remaining coefficients to be the same 
across countries. The estimates correspond to a fixed effects model with 
country dummies, and are therefore a within estimate. The dummy 
coefficients are not reported. In order to choose between the most 
restrictive model and the within estimates, an F test is carried out, whose 
results are reported in the lines headed by F"'. In column (3) we 
(5) Unfortunately, our data do not allow private and public 
infrastructure to be separated out. It may be argued that both types of 
infrastructure should have roughly the same effects on productivity. In 
any case, this fact has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
(6) This test is formulated as: 
SSRR - SSRU/(ku - kr) 
SSRU/(T - ku) -
F{kU - kr). (T - ku) 
where U and R stand for the unrestricted and the restricted model, 
respectively, SSR is the sum of squared residuals, k is the number of 
estimated coefficients and T is the total number of observations. 
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report the estimates of the model in first differences. Such an approach 
not only takes into account fixed effects, which drop out when the model 
is specified in first differences. but may be regarded as a way of dealing 
with non-stationarity when this problem is present. Column (4) reports 
the results obtained from a random effects model. The main difference 
with the within estimator is that the country specific effects are now 
treated as random and uncorrelated with the regressors. A Hausman test 
is constructed to check for this restriction, with the results shown in the 
row labeled X2 in table 1 (7). 
As far as the first equation is concerned J the signs of the 
coefficients are the expected ones under the different estimated models. 
The F test does not allow to accept the restricted model to be accepted 
when the alternative includes country-fixed effects and, on the other 
hand, the random effects model cannot be rejected when the alternative 
is the country-fixed effects model. Therefore. the results in columns (1) 
and (2) can be disregarded as far as the first equation is concerned. The 
evidence in column (3) implies a negative impact of both public 
consumption and investment on private investment, although only the 
public consumption coefficient is statistically significant. When the results 
in column (4) are analyzed, it appears that the impact of public 
investment on private investment is negative, but not statistically 
significant. The same result applies to public consumption. 
(7) The Hausman test is formulated as: 
- -
where �w is the vector of the k within-group estimates. �GLS is the 
correspondipg gen.eralized least squares estimate of the random effects 
model, and V wand V GLS are their respective estimated variance"'covariance 
matrices_ Under the null hypothesis of no correlation (the random effects 
model), it is the case that: 
plim (P. - PGLS) = 0 
N�m 
and H is distributed as a )(' with k degrees of freedom (excluding 
intercepts) . 
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The lack of significance of both public sector investment and 
government consumption in the investment equation (equation 14) under 
the random effects model might arise from collinearity between these two 
variables. If this were the case, dropping one variable would increase the 
statistical significance of the other. Columns (5) and (6) report the 
results of the estimation of equation (14) under a random effects model, 
when 82 or 8) are restricted to zero. It should be noted that the Hausman 
test does not reject the null hypothesis of non-correlation between the 
country effects and the observable variables J i. e. the random effects 
model is not rejected by the data. While the value of the coefficient of 
marginal private capital productivity is quite stable across specifications, 
the estimated coefficients for public investment and public consumption 
do not show such robustness. In fact, the new estimates seem to indicate 
that public investment has a marginally significant direct impact on 
private investment while public consumption also has a negative but small 
impact. Therefore, both public consumption and public investment, 
appear to crowd out private investment, although the statistical 
significance of these results is rather weak. Note finally that, under the 
specification in first differences (column 3) -a valid reference in the 
presence of non-stationarity in the data- only consumption spending has 
a significantly negative effect on private investment. All in all, our 
evidence does not uncover any significant crowding-out effects associated 
with public investment when productivity is held constant, while results 
on the negative effects of public consumption on private investment are 
mixed. 
With regard to the productivity equation (equation 15), it is also 
the case that the signs obtained under the four specifications are the 
expected ones. The constant returns to scale restriction was imposed 
after a preliminary test of its validity'S). While the F test rejects the 
restricted specification in column (I) in favour of the fixed effects model, 
the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of correlation 
between the country effects and the regressors. Thus, the within 
estimates in column (2) appear to be the most appropriate on statistical 
(8) When a test of this restriction was carried out, the result was that 
under the country fixed effects model it cannot be rejected. 
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grounds. The negative effect of private capital reflects the decreasing 
marginal productivity. The results strongly suggest a positive effect of 
infrastructures on private productivity, so that it may be argued that 
public investment accumulated in the past appears to enhance 
productivity. The estimates in column (3), with the model in first 
differences, lead to the same conclusions, although the infrastructure 
variable becomes less significant. Therefore, the results suggest that 
there is an indirect crowding-in effect through the positive impact of 
public infrastructures on private productivity. 
Besides the possibility of the series not being stationary, so that 
the results in levels could be a reflection of a spurious relationship, 
endogeneity may be present: it would arise from the relationship between 
private investment and private capital, a case in which OLS would provide 
inefficient estimates. The first limitation has already been tackled through 
the estimation of both equations in first differences (column 3 in Table 1). 
In order to deal with the endogeneity issue we can use instrumental 
variable techniques. The estimates of this latter specification (provided 
in Table Al of the Appendix) produce very similar qualitative results. 
Public consumption appears to have a significantly negative impact on 
private investment. On the other hand, the role of public investment is 
clarified: its coefficient keeps the expected negative sign but does not 
appear to be significant, both when public consumption and investment 
are jointly taken into account, as well as in the case where public 
consumption is not included in the regression. Thus evidence in favour 
of a direct crowding out associated with public investment is weak. With 
regard to the second equation, infrastructure has a positive impact on 
productivity, in line with the results reached when no simultaneity 
considerations were involved(g). 
(g) As a means of testing the specification of the productivity equation, 
a direct estimation of a production function is discussed in the Appendix. 
It provides additional evidence on the technology of the countries under 
study, and on the productive role of infrastructures. The results 
presented in Table A2 of the Appendix show. again that there is a 
crowding-in effect of public investment through its positive impact on 
private sector productivity. Such a result reinforces those obtained 
through the estimation of a productivity function with productivity 
proxied by the ratio of gross operating surplus to private productive 
capital. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated the relationship between private 
investment and public spending. The paper has aimed to test the presence 
of private investment crowding out by current expenditure (public 
consumption) and capital expenditure (public investment), with an 
unbalanced panel data set for 14 industrialized countries for the period 
1979 to 1987. 
The empirical results presented in the paper lend support to the 
existence of a crowding-in effect of private investment by public 
investment, through the positive impact of infrastructure on private 
investment productivity. Moreover, there is little or no evidence of direct 
crowding out of private investment by public investment when 
productivity is held constant, while there is some evidence of crowding 
out by public consumption. 
Given the data limitations, we need to be cautious about applying 
these results to particular instances. It is quite possible that specific 
types of government consumption may help GDP growth, and the opposite 
might be true for some public investment projects. On the other hand, the 
analysis presented in the paper does not deny that particular ways of 
funding public spending may exert their own influence upon investment. 
All in all, our findings stress the need to distinguish carefully 
between current and capital expenditure when evaluating the impact of 
fiscal policy on private investment and output growth. From a policy 
view, the implications of the evidence are of foremost importance when it 
comes to fiscal consolidation. Public deficit reductions that rely mainly on 
public investment cuts could severely impinge upon private investment 
and growth prospects. 
-16-
APPENDIX 
A. DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
The source of the variables is the Summers and Heston (1991) 
database PWT5. The periods and countries have been chosen by a data 
availability criteria, so that all the countries with data on public and 
private infrastructure have been included. Although we are interested in 
having a public capital variable, the Summers and Heston database does 
not provide a separation between public and private infrastructure. It 
may be argued that public and private infrastructure should have roughly 
the same effects on productivity. To the extent that public investment 
increases the stock of infrastructure capital, the crowding-out issue can 
be discussed along the lines suggested by the theoretical literature. 
Variable definitions: 
a) Private investment: 
i = I . RGDPW . IPRI I (Kdur . Kapw) 
b) Public investment 
i. = I . RGDPW ( 1 - IPRI) I (Kdur . Kapw) 
c) Capital productivity 
f. = (1 - a) . RGDPW I (Kdur . Kapw) 
d) Public consumption 
c. = G. RDGPW I (Kdur . Kapw) 
e) Private productive capital per capita 
k = (Kdur + Knres) . Kapw 
-17 -
f) Public and private infrastructure per capita 
k. ; Kother . Kapw 
g) Production per worker 
y 
= RGDPW 
where all the variables are expressed at constant international prices and 
I: 
RGDPW: 
IPRI: 
Kdur: 
Kapw: 
Kother: 
Knres: 
G: 
a: 
Total investment over GDP (1985 in!. prices). 
Real GDP per worker (1985 in!. prices). 
Gross domestic private investment share in total investment. 
Producer durables (% of Kapw) . 
Capital stock per worker (1985 in!. prices). 
Other construction (% of Kapw). 
Nonresidential construction (!Is of Kapw). 
Public consumption share in GDP. 
Share of wages participation in GDP, calculated as the ratio 
of compensation of employees over GDP In every year of the 
sample (OECD data) 
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B. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES 
TABLE AI. CROWDING-OUT EFFECTS 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
(1979-88) 
(1) (2) (3) 
fll;jt 0.80 0. 74 0.80 
(4.92)" (4.68)" (5.00)" 
eq (1) igjt -0.07 -0.62 
(0.13) (1.36) 
Cgjt -1.02 -1.05 
(2.28)" (2.66)" 
In(k/l)J' -0.56 
(4.06)" 
eq (2) 
In(k./l)J' 1.07 
(6.29)" 
eq (1) 0.024 0. 024 0.024 
a 
eq (2) 0. 041 
t x i 112 112 112 
0: standard error of the regression 
The instruments used are fkt_1J Cgt_1 and igt in equation (l) and In (k/l)t_l 
and In (k./l), in equation (2). Country dummies where included in both 
equations as instruments. 
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C. PRODUCTION FUNCTION EQUATION 
The estimated equation is given by 
In (y/l) = a + (l-a-Il) In[k/I] + II In[k.l1] 
where 
so that again the restriction of constant returns to scale has been 
imposed(lO). The results are presented in table A2. The inclusion of a 
time trend, t, aiming at capturing technological change, results in the 
estimates shown in columns (2), (4), and (6). The random effects model 
seems to be the one that fits better the data. The positive and statistically 
significant sign of the infrastructure variable seems to be present in all 
models, except under column (4). However, in that case, the trend 
variable is not statistically significant either, so that the specification 
seems to be rejected by the data. 
The fact that the random effects model cannot be rejected 
statistically may be a reflection of the fact that the technological 
heterogeneity among the different countries is not directly related to the 
different initial states of the technology. In fact, it could be identical for 
all countries, and the individual effects could be related to other aspects 
of the economic environment. 
Looking at columns (5) and (6) it may be concluded that, although 
the output elasticity with respect to infrastructure is smaller that the 
elasticity with respect to private capital, the results imply again that 
there is crowding in of public investment, through its positive impact on 
private productivity. This result reinforces those presented in Table 1. 
('0) The tests of the hypothesis of constant returns to scale are not 
completely satisfactory, even when the within estimator is considered. 
However, given the specification of the productivity function it seems 
more reasonable to have constant returns to scale. 
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